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Abstract
When making judgments in a group, individuals often revise their initial beliefs about the
best judgment to make given what others believe. Despite the ubiquity of this phenomenon,
we know little about how the brain updates beliefs when integrating personal judgments
(individual information) with those of others (social information). Here, we investigated the
neurocomputational mechanisms of how we adapt our judgments to those made by groups
of different sizes, in the context of jury decisions for a criminal. By testing different theoretical
models, we showed that a social Bayesian inference model captured changes in judgments
better than 2 other models. Our results showed that participants updated their beliefs by
appropriately weighting individual and social sources of information according to their
respective credibility. When investigating 2 fundamental computations of Bayesian infer-
ence, belief updates and credibility estimates of social information, we found that the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) computed the level of belief updates, while the bilateral
frontopolar cortex (FPC) was more engaged in individuals who assigned a greater credibility
to the judgments of a larger group. Moreover, increased functional connectivity between
these 2 brain regions reflected a greater influence of group size on the relative credibility of
social information. These results provide a mechanistic understanding of the computational
roles of the FPC-dACC network in steering judgment adaptation to a group’s opinion. Taken
together, these findings provide a computational account of how the human brain integrates
individual and social information for decision-making in groups.
Author summary
In collective decisions, both the size of groups and the confidence that each member has
in their own judgment determine how much a given individual will adapt to the judgment
of the group. Here, we show that judgment adaptation during collective decisions—a fun-
damental brain mechanism needed for fluid functioning of social organizations—can be
accounted for by Bayesian inference computations. At the time of judgment adaptation,
individuals trade off the credibility inferred from their own confidence levels against the
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credibility of social information. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represented
belief updates, while the lateral frontopolar cortex (FPC) monitored the changes in credi-
bility assigned to social information. These results provide a neurocomputational under-
standing of how individuals benefit both from the wisdom of larger groups and from their
own confidence.
Introduction
When making decisions in a group, individuals can adapt their initial beliefs according to the
social influence produced by the opinions of other individuals in the group. In modern society,
this type of process is widespread and can be seen in settings ranging from work meetings to
the courtroom. In these instances, individuals are asked to come together to produce a group
decision while considering the opinions of others [1,2]. An essential component of this process
is the need for individuals to adapt their opinions to others to reach a collective decision [3].
Determining the factors that underlie such judgment adaptation is, therefore, critical to under-
standing collective decisions. A key factor identified in social psychology that is known to
influence whether subjects change their decisions to conform to those of others is group size
[4,5]. Specifically, the larger the group size, the more people conform to the group’s opinion,
but only up to a certain point [6,7]. To benefit from the opinion of others, the brain needs to
track the likelihood that the group is making the most appropriate judgment [8] by estimating
the credibility of social information [9–11]. One potential way to make such judgment adapta-
tion to the group’s opinion possible is to assign greater credibility to a larger group’s opinion
than to a smaller group’s opinion. Evidence for this mechanism come from studies comparing
6- and 12-person juries, showing that a larger jury is more likely to overcome its biases [12,13]
and to obtain a result that represents the population mean more accurately than a smaller jury
[14,15]. A statistical phenomenon that is known as the “wisdom of the crowd” also explains
how the aggregated opinion of a group of individuals can be even more accurate than the esti-
mates of experts [16–18]. Herding behavior in purchasing decisions [19,20] and collective ani-
mal behavior demonstrate a similar effect of group size on conformity [21,22]. These examples
indicate the importance of group size for social decision-making. Assigning credibility to a
more reliable source of information and reducing uncertainty are not only critical for learning
appropriately but also to adapt to a group’s opinion [9,23]. However, little is known about how
the brain estimates the credibility of aggregate opinions of groups of different sizes.
A mechanistic account of how the human brain integrates individual and social informa-
tion for making decisions in groups is still unclear. Previous studies have established that peo-
ple track and use social information based on its credibility [24,25]. However, so far, studies
on social conformity have only accounted for the fact that changes in judgments within a
group are driven by the motive to decrease social conflict [26–28]. In contrast, here, we consid-
ered that the changes in judgments in a group could be driven by belief updates that consider
the credibility of each source of information rather than by social conformity. Such belief
updates are distinct from social conformity, which exclusively concerns the difference between
individual and social judgments. Moreover, previous studies did not take into account the con-
fidence that people have in their own judgments and the influence of this confidence on judg-
ment adaptation [11,29]. Yet, confidence in one’s decision plays a key role in revising one’s
previous decision [30,31], and this is also likely to be true when integrating social information.
Indeed, people are more likely to follow social information when they lack confidence in their
own judgment [9]. Thus, we hypothesized that both confidence in one’s initial decision and
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group size are critical to account for integration of individual and social information during
group decision-making.
Here, we examined the neural mechanisms enabling the consideration of the credibility of
both individual information and social information. We first investigated whether the credibil-
ity of individual information and the credibility of social information are respectively modu-
lated by one’s own confidence level and group size. Second, we investigated how the brain
adapts to the judgments of others according to the credibility of each source of information.
To address these questions, we tested different computational models that accounted for the
changes in one’s judgments within a group as an adaptive decision-making process. Moreover,
to characterize the neurocomputational mechanisms engaged in judgment adaptation, we
used model-based functional MRI (fMRI) and a new paradigm in which participants were
asked to make a series of punitive judgments on murder cases as part of a jury (Fig 1A). First,
they made a judgment on the appropriate punishment (in prison years) for a criminal (first
individual judgment [J1]; default was 15 years) along with an estimation of their level of confi-
dence (C) in each judgment. They were then given the opportunity to reconsider and to update
their first judgment (J1) to make a second judgment (J2) with the given knowledge of the aver-
age judgment of the other members of the jury (judgment of a social group [JS] where “S”
stands for social information). Crucially, the size of the juries varied, being either large (20 jury
members) or small (5 jury members) groups. Thus, the credibility of social information avail-
able to jurors could be estimated as either high or low, respectively (Fig 1B).
We developed and tested a Bayesian model of decision making under social influence. Neu-
roimaging studies of perceptual decision-making provide evidence that an observer has a men-
tal model to conduct Bayesian inferences to infer probable states of the world from their
observations [32,33]. In the field of social decision-making, although recent theoretical models
proposed that such a Bayesian framework may be applied to understand decision-making
under social influence [23,34], empirical evidence for characterizing the neural signals of such
social decisions is still lacking. Our Bayesian model assumes that people process their own
judgments and the judgments of others as distinct probability distributions considering the
likelihoods of the most appropriate judgment. In this framework, the level of precision of each
distribution represents the credibility that an individual assigns to each type of information
[8,35,36]. We tested whether participants use, on one hand, the confidence levels in their own
judgments to infer the credibility of their individual information and, on the other hand, the
size of the group to estimate the credibility of social information. In such a Bayesian account,
individuals integrate different sources of information and generate a novel belief [37], suggest-
ing that the brain assigns different weights to individual and social information according to
their respective credibility.
First, we compared our Bayesian model with alternative models. These alternative models
had access to the same information about the choice options but assumed different computa-
tions when participants were presented with the judgments of others. We found that the
Bayesian decision-making model explained the magnitudes of judgment changes of jurors bet-
ter than other alternative models. That is, jurors integrated their individual levels of confidence
and estimated levels of credibility of social information to construct a novel belief about what
would be the most proper judgment and adjusted their judgments accordingly.
Second, we investigated the neural implementations of 2 fundamental computations of
Bayesian inference during collective decisions, belief updates and credibility estimates of social
information. We found that activity of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) reflected
updates of one’s beliefs after integrating social information, rather than alternative computa-
tions from the other 2 models. For Bayesian computation, the belief update signals should
monitor the cognitive process tracking changes in the credibility of social information. We
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thus further investigated which brain regions estimated the credibility of social information
during judgment adaptation. To this end, we reasoned that if a region is engaged in computing
the credibility of social information: (i) it should show greater activity when participants were
given more-credible judgments by the large group than when given less-credible information
by the small group; (ii) this region should provide greater inputs to the dACC to modulate
one’s belief with increases in the credibility of social information, and this may be reflected by
greater functional connectivity between this region and the dACC at the time of judgment
adaptation; and (iii) both the activity and the functional connectivity of this region may repre-
sent individual differences in the willingness to assign greater credibility to judgments of the
large group compared to judgments of the small group.
Results
Behavioral results
The mean punishment magnitude at the stage of the initial judgment (J1) was 14.44 ± 0.25
years (standard error of the mean [SEM]; Fig 1C, left graph). For trials in which the jury group
was small, the mean judgment magnitude was 14.17 ± 0.35 years, and, for trials in which the
Fig 1. Experimental design and changes in legal judgments of participants while confronted with the
judgments of other jurors. (A) After reading a murder case (52 scenarios in total), participants made their
first judgment (J1) by deciding how many years in prison the criminal should be punished with, then they rated
their own confidence level in this initial judgment, and eventually reconsidered their initial judgment to make
their second and final judgment (J2) when provided with the averaged judgment of other jury members. Thus,
participants could change the magnitude of their punishment from J1 to J2 after considering social information
(the judgment of a social group, JS), which was the average number of prison years prescribed by the other
jurors. Participants were informed that the other jurors were previous participants who had high-level
confidence in their judgments. Our functional MRI (fMRI) analyses were focused on brain activity associated
with judgment adaptation (6th screen) while controlling for other events. (B) A cue was shown at the beginning
of each block to indicate the condition—5 jury members (small group trials, G = 0) or 20 jury members (large
group trials, G = 1), providing the total number of members of the jury who participated in the judgment. (C)
Behavioral results show that participants changed their initial judgment J1 to J2 to conform to the averaged
judgment of other members, JS. Such change was modulated by the confidence that participants assigned to
their initial judgment, J1 (**, P < 0.01). That is, in trials with low confidence, participants increased
(respectively decreased) their sentence if it was lower (respectively higher) than the one from other jury
members. (D) Color-map showing noncollinearity among factors considered to influence the changes in
judgments. All experimental factors were independent, except for the correlation between one’s confidence
level (C) and the initial judgments (|J1|) (P < 0.01). D: difference between judgments (JS − J1); S: type of
scenario (−1, sympathetic; 1, nonsympathetic scenarios). The data underlying Fig 1C and Fig 1D can be
found in S1 Data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958.g001
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jury group was large, the mean judgment magnitude was 14.71 ± 0.36 years. Magnitudes of ini-
tial punishment judgment did not differ between trials of different jury group size (P = 0.28).
Participants changed their initial judgment, J1, to conform to the group opinion (JS) in
27.58 ± 1.47 trials on average. In the rest of the trials (24.42 ± 1.47), participants kept their ini-
tial judgments. We then investigated how the opinion of others influenced the second judg-
ment (J2) by separating the cases in which the initial judgment was either lower or higher than
the judgment of others. The range of the difference between the initial judgment and social
information (D = JS − J1) was, by design, divided into 2 intervals of punishment years, and the
group never had the same level of punishment judgments as individual participants (J1 6¼ JS;
see Materials and methods). In addition, the mean confidence rating was 0.69 ± 0.22, being
normalized on a scale from 0, no confidence at all, to 1, high confidence. We confirmed that
all participants chose the lowest and the highest confidence rating at least once. Confidence
did not differ between the size of jury group (F = 4.91, P = 0.27) or between blocks (F = 3.81,
P = 0.34).
We observed that individuals tended to increase the magnitude of their punishments
(J2 = 18.93 ± 0.33 years, P< 0.001) when the judgments of group were more severe than
those of the juror (JS> J1) and tended to decrease the magnitude of their punishments (J2 =
10.82 ± 0.30 years, P< 0.001) when the judgments of group were more lenient than those of
the juror (JS< J1). To investigate whether changes in judgments (J2 − J1) were driven by the
perceived difference in judgments (J1 − JS), we computed the level of conformity (LC; Eq 1).
Based on this measure, conformity trials were defined as LC> 0 and nonconformity trials as
LC 0. The average level of conformity was strictly positive (LC = 0.24 ± 0.01), suggesting that
the effect of social influence was significant.
Next, we investigated how different levels of confidence assigned to the initial judgments
(J1) influenced the level of changes in judgments. After median splits of all trials based on each
individual’s confidence ratings, we observed that confidence had a similar effect on changes in
judgments (from J1 to J2). That is, on average, people tended to conform more to the group
opinion when they had low confidence in their initial judgment. When one’s initial judgment
was more lenient than the judgment of the group, individuals tended to increase the magni-
tude of their punishments more when they were less confident of their initial judgment (J2L
(low confidence) = 19.88 ± 0.36 years, P< 0.001) compared to when they were more confident
of their initial judgment (J2H (high confidence) = 16.64 ± 0.46, P< 0.001, Fig 1C, middle
graphs). When the initial judgment was more severe than the judgment of the group, individu-
als tended to decrease the magnitude of their punishments more when they were less confident
of this initial judgment (J2L = 9.88 ± 0.41, P< 0.001) compared to when they were more confi-
dent of this initial judgment (J2H = 12.21 ± 0.42, P< 0.001; Fig 1C, right graph).
To clarify how the factors manipulated in the task influence changes in judgments (J2 − J1),
we performed a statistical analysis using the linear mixed-effects modeling analysis (LMEM).
We found that changes in judgments significantly depended on the difference between judg-
ments (D, F = 31.79, P< 0.01), their confidence levels (C, F = 2.67, P = 0.003), their interaction
(D × C, F = 2.45, P< 0.01), and the interaction between the difference in judgments and group
size (D × G, F = 2.05, P = 0.02). These changes did not depend on the group size (G, F = 3.49,
P = 0.12), the types of scenario (S, F = 1.05, P = 0.39), the regression-to-the-mean effect of the
initial judgments (|J1|, F = 3.12, P = 0.12; see Materials and methods for details), and the inter-
action between the difference between judgments and types of scenario D × S (F = 1.19,
P = 0.28). To illustrate this effect more clearly, we performed additional factorial analyses. By
splitting all trials with high- and low-confident judgments using each individual’s median
value of confidence rating, we found that participants were more likely to conform to others
when confidence in their judgments was low (F = 61.64, P< 0.001), which provided additional
Integration of individual and social information for group decisions
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evidence supporting the effects of confidence level (C) on decisions to conform to the judg-
ments of others (LC).
We further examined whether some of these experimental factors are correlated with each
other. The level of collinearity between experimental factors is shown in Fig 1D. As illustrated,
we only found a relationship between initial judgments (|J1|) and level of confidence (C). That
is, participants tended to make more extreme judgments (close to 0 or 30 years) when they had
greater confidence in their judgments (R2 = 0.43, P< 0.01). This correlation might be caused
by the “status quo”—the tendency of decision-makers to stay close to the given default when
having low confidence in their decision [38,39].
Computational modeling of behavioral data
To examine how the brain computes social updating during group decision-making and to
know whether and how much the brain decides to change initial judgments, we proposed and
compared 3 computational models.
The “linear model” (Eq 7) predicts changes in judgments by a linear regression model
that takes into account one’s initial judgments (J1), given deviation in the group judgments
(D = JS−J1), the level of confidence that one had for their judgments (C), and 3 interaction
effects considering group size (G) and the types of scenarios (S) (D × C, D × G and D × S). In
doing so, the “linear model” tests whether individuals are motivated to reduce the perceived
deviation in the group judgments by adjusting their prior judgments to be more consistent
with that of the group.
The “surprise model” (Eq 8) assumes that participants change their judgments more when
they are more likely to observe unexpected group judgments, given their prior belief about the
most preferable judgments (J). Thus, surprising events have greater impacts to drive changes
in judgments. According to information theory [40], surprise evoked by the observation of
unpredicted event α is computed as the inverse entropy of the predictability of the event, par-
ticipants having their own prior belief (−log p(α|Prior)). The level of precision of the prior
belief, thus, was computed as the variance of a normal distribution, which depends upon a
function of confidence ratings, (p(J1|Prior) ~ N(μ = J1, σ2 = f(C)−1). Moreover, we assumed that
participants were more surprised when the deviation (D) was given from the judgments of a
larger group (D × G) and when the group proposed a more severe (or more lenient) level of
punishment than their own when making judgments for the sympathetic (or nonsympathetic)
scenarios (D × S).
The “Bayesian model” (Eq 6) assumes that participants tried to estimate the most preferable
judgments (J). The punishment—the years of prison that the defendant deserved—is dependent
on this estimated judgment. Initial judgments (J1) were based on individuals’ private estimates
(jIndividual) after reading the scenario of a crime case. The distribution, p(jIndividual|J), represented
the probability that their private estimate was the most preferable. The credibility of individual
information, thus, was represented as the level of precision of a normal distribution that
depends on a function of confidence ratings, p(jIndividual|J) ~ N(μ = J1, σ2 = f(C)−1). When social
information is presented, participants may assign different levels of credibility as a function of
changes in group size, p(jSocial|J) ~ N(μ = JS, σ2 = f(G)−1). More importantly, to explain that
changes in judgments are driven by changes in one’s belief about what would be morally correct
and what level of punishment would be the right amount for the crime, the “Bayesian model”
integrates available information while considering their level of credibility. Therefore, this
model also assumes that the brain computes the extent of belief updates. The extent of belief
updates was well captured with Kullback–Leibler divergence (DKL), which shows the
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dissimilarity between 2 probability distributions of the individual estimate, p(jIndividual|J), and
final estimate, p(J|jIndividual, jSocial), of individuals (Fig 2).
Parameter estimation
The parameters that maximize the likelihood of the model based prediction of the actual
changes in judgments were estimated for each of the 3 computational models. The parameter
estimates in the “linear model” suggest that changes in judgments were significantly driven by
the difference in judgments (D), the level of confidence in the initial judgments (C), and their
interaction (D × C) (P< 0.05, 1-sample t test, Fig 3A).
Notably, both the “surprise model” and the “Bayesian model” assume that the confidence
level in one’s own belief serves to estimate the level of precision of the prior belief. In contrast
Fig 2. The Bayesian model predicting the changes in judgments under social influence. Individuals form a private estimate
of the most preferable level of punishment for a criminal and make their initial judgments (J1). When the judgments of other social
group members (JS) are observed, participants assigned weights to individual (J1; left panel) and social information (JS; middle
panel) according to their respective credibility. These 2 beliefs are integrated into the final estimate (J2; right panel). Judgments are
adjusted according to this final estimate. Changes in judgments from J1 to J2 were predicted by the belief updates, estimated by
Kullback–Leibler divergence (DKL).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958.g002
Fig 3. Model comparisons of the predictability of the changes in judgments. (A) Parameter estimates in the “linear model” indicating
that participants assign a significant weight to the differences in judgments (D), their confidence level (C), and the interaction between
them (D × C), but not to the interaction with group size (D ×G) and scenario types (D × S) (Eq 7). Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean (SEM). (B) The “surprise model” hypothesized that participants who have greater confidence in their judgments are more
likely to be surprised by unexpected differences in judgments with a social group and to adapt their judgments to the given judgments of
groups. However, the parameter estimates in this model suggest that the different level of confidence could not explain the different level
of judgment adaptation (Eq 8). (C) The “Bayesian model” (Eq 6) provides 2 individual, specific functions that allow us to track the changes
in credibility. First, individual jurors were more likely to assign credibility to their individual information (J1) when they had a higher level of
confidence (left panel). Second, participants assigned more credibility on social information (JS) when it was provided by a larger (n = 20)
compared to a smaller (n = 5) group (**, P < 0.001; right panel). (D) The likelihoods of each model prediction were estimated by a leave-
one-out-cross-validation (LOOCV) procedure, and the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) were compared between models. The BIC
showed that predicted changes in judgments of the “Bayesian model” fit better to the actual changes in judgments than the other models
(**, P < 0.001). The data underlying this figure can be found in S1 Data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958.g003
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to the “Bayesian model,” in which greater credibility is assigned to more confident judgments,
the “surprise model” assumes that participants are more likely to be surprised by the unex-
pected judgments of others, especially when they had a high degree of confidence in their own
judgment [33,40]. However, the parameter estimates showed that the “surprise model” could
not capture the different levels of judgment adaptation when confidence varied (Fig 3B).
The “Bayesian model” not only took into account the punishment magnitude of individual
judgments, J1, and the judgments of others, JS, but also the beliefs that the participant had
about the credibility of individual information and social information, respectively. This
framework allowed us to find the credibility that participants assigned to their individual
information as a function of confidence rating and its updates after integrating social informa-
tion according to its credibility. The relationship between confidence reports and the credibil-
ity of individual information was measured by a parameter, ωC, across participants (Eq 2).
The mean parameter estimate of ωC was 1.13 ± 0.47, which was significantly greater than 0
(P< 0.001, 1-sample test), suggesting its significant effect. That is, participants put more credi-
bility on their own judgments when they had higher confidence (F = 15.63; P< 0.001; LMEM;
Fig 3C, left graph). Moreover, we tested whether participants took into account changes in
group size when estimating the credibility of social information through the integration of
social information with their prior individual information. The “Bayesian model” provided
evidence of significant effects of group size on the credibility of social information. Again,
we observed that participants assigned more credibility to the judgments of a larger group
(F = 121.77; P< 0.001; 1-way ANOVA; Fig 3C right graph).
Comparisons between Bayesian model and alternative models
Among the models, the Bayesian model offered a better fit than the others (comparing the like-
lihood of each model, P< 0.001, 1-way ANOVA; Eq 10). The mean –2log likelihood of the
Bayesian model was 8.55 ± 0.16, while those of the “linear model” and the “surprise model”
were 14.12 ± 0.25 and 20.62 ± 0.44, respectively. To avoid potential overfitting, we predicted
each of the levels of judgment adaptation across trials of all participants using an iterative
leave-one-out-cross-validation (LOOCV) procedure and estimated the likelihood of the pre-
diction and actual changes in judgments. Furthermore, we penalized the likelihood and
computed the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) that took into account the number of free
parameters in each model (P< 0.001, 1-way ANOVA, Eq 11; Fig 3D).
Neural networks underlying Bayesian computation of judgment
adaptation
We found that dACC activation (peak voxel x,y,z = −3,14,44) increased when participants
reconsidered their initial judgment and adapted it towards the judgment of the group
(P< 0.05, family-wise error [FWE] corrected within small volume correction [SVC], T = 4.45,
Fig 4A). We also found dACC activation in the same cluster (peak voxel x,y,z = 0,12,39) when
an alternative general linear model (GLM) with a fixed boxcar duration independent of reac-
tions times (= 4 s) was applied (P< 0.05, FWE corrected within SVC, T = 4.75; S1 Fig). This
alternative model allowed us to exclude alternative hypotheses regarding dACC functions as
reflecting speed of response or invigoration rather than judgment adaptation.
Having established that the Bayesian model better accounted for the behavioral data than
other models, we tested whether the changes in judgment predicted by the Bayesian model
more accurately explain the conformity-related brain signal in dACC than those predicted by
the other models. To address this, we used an additional GLM (GLM3) in which the brain
response was modeled by 4 parametric regressors without serial orthogonalization. We then
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extracted the time courses of beta parameters from the dACC ROI. The goodness-of-fits of
those time courses were measured with the likelihood of predicting the dACC time courses
that represented the changes in judgment. The mean value of −2log likelihood and BIC (in
parenthesis) are as follows: 2.37 ± 0.14 (6.32 ± 0.14) for the Bayesian model, 4.68 ± 0.12
(8.63 ± 0.12) for the “linear model,” and 5.23 ± 0.19 (9.18 ± 0.19) for the “surprise model.” In
addition, we computed BIC to penalize likelihoods by the numbers of free parameters used by
each model. We found that the time courses extracted from the “Bayesian model” explained
conformity decision–related dACC activity more robustly than time courses extracted from
the other models (P< 0.001, 1-way ANOVA, Fig 4B).
We also performed the same analysis with an alternative GLM using a fixed boxcar duration
of 4 s. The time courses of beta parameters were extracted from the same predefined dACC
ROI. The goodness of fit of those time courses of model predictions was measured with the
likelihood and BIC. The mean value of −2log likelihood and BIC (in parenthesis) are as fol-
lows: 2.69 ± 0.20 (6.64 ± 0.20) for the Bayesian model, 5.16 ± 0.11 (9.11 ± 0.11) for the “linear
model,” and 5.80 ± 0.17 (9.75 ± 0.17) for the “surprise mode.” We found that the Bayesian
model was significantly lower than those of other models (P< 0.001, 1-way ANOVA).
To ensure that dACC activation cannot be explained by response selection difficulty, as sug-
gested previously by Shenhav and colleagues [41–43], we performed a similar analysis to the
one from O’Reilly and Kolling [33,44,45] by including, in the same GLM, the update term
regressor DKL as well as the level of surprise and reaction times (GLM4). This allowed the belief
update regressor to compete with these measures of difficulty to explain variance in dACC
activity. The results of this new GLM confirmed the robustness of our dACC activity as reflect-
ing a Bayesian update signal of one’s beliefs after integrating social information (peak voxel x,
Fig 4. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activity when changing judgments to conform to the
group’s and comparison between the predictions of different models in this brain region. (A) The
dACC was more engaged with conformity trials compared with nonconformity trials. (B) The Bayesian model
explains dACC activity more accurately than those of alternative models (general linear model [GLM]3). The
time courses accounting for the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal in association with the changes
in judgments were extracted from the region of interest (ROI) in dACC. These time courses were compared
with other time courses in association with the predictions of each model about changes in judgments. Error
bars represent the standard error of the mean (SEM). All the parameters were estimated from the same ROI
defined in the dACC (10-mm diameter spherical ROI at x, y, z = 8, 18, 46; **, P < 0.001). The functional MRI
(fMRI) data can be found in http://neurovault.org/collections/2503/. The data underlying Fig 4B can be found
in S1 Data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958.g004
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y,z = 6,8,49; P< 0.05, FWE corrected within SVC; S2 Fig). This result demonstrates that this
dACC signal can be dissociated from tracking choice difficulty.
Computationally, tracking changes in the credibility of social information is required to
update one’s belief. If dACC activity represents the level of belief updates as evidenced by the
results of the “Bayesian model,” then this brain region would require feedbacks when the cred-
ibility of group judgments changes. Moreover, if the credibility of group judgment is processed
separately by other brain areas, functional connectivity to dACC should increase in order to
guide subsequent judgment adaptation. We thus tested for brain regions implicated in social
credibility during the integration of social information.
First, we found that activity in the right lateral frontopolar cortex (FPC; [x,y,z] =
[42,44,19]), in the precuneus (x,y,z) = (18,−58,31), and in the bilateral inferior parietal lob-
ule ([x,y,z] = [60,−34.43] for right inferior parietal lobule [iPL] and [−54,−49,52] for left
iPL) was greater when participants were presented with the judgments of large group com-
pared to when presented with the judgments of small group (Fig 5A; PFWE < 0.05, whole-
brain corrected at cluster level; GLM2).
Second, to investigate which brain regions show individual differences in relative credibility
as a function of group size, we performed a whole-brain regression analysis with Δσ (Eq 4). We
found that the bilateral FPC was the only area representing this parameter: left FPC peak voxel
(x,y,z) = (−30,58,15); right FPC peak voxel (x,y,z) = (27,57,10) (Fig 5B; PFWE < 0.05; whole-
brain corrected at the cluster level; GLM2). This result indicates that participants who had
greater activation in the FPC showed higher differences in the credibility that they assigned
to the judgments of a larger group relative to those of a smaller group. By extracting the
Fig 5. Brain regions engaged in social credibility while integrating social information and individual
information to update one’s belief about the preferable judgments. (A) The activity in the right lateral
frontopolar cortex (FPC; [x,y,z] = [42,44,19]), in the precuneus (x,y,z) = (18,−58,31), and in the bilateral
inferior parietal lobule (x,y,z) = (60,−34.43) and (−54,−49,52) was greater when participants were given the
high-credible judgments of the large group than those when they were given the relatively low-credible
information of the small group (P < 0.05, whole-brain family-wise error [FWE] corrected at cluster level;
general linear model [GLM]2). (B) Whole-brain regression analysis between brain activity and the individual
differences, Δσ, represents the ratio between the credibility of social information in the large group and the
credibility of social information in the small group. We found that the different activity in the bilateral FPC
represented the individual differences in Δσ. That is, participants with greater activation in the FPC showed
higher differences in the credibility that they assigned to the judgments of a larger group relative to those of a
smaller group (P < 0.05 FWE corrected at the cluster level; GLM2). The functional MRI (fMRI) data can be
found in http://neurovault.org/collections/2503/. The data underlying Fig 5B can be found in S1 Data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958.g005
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parameter estimates from FPC activations, we showed a linear relationship between individual
differences in FPC activation and sensitivity to group sizes for assigning credibility to social
information. Moreover, these effects were significant when we applied bootstrapping sam-
pling: the effect size in right FPC was 3.53 ± 0.18 (SEM) with a 95% confidence interval
between 2.16 and 5.53; the effect size in left FPC was 3.11 ± 0.24 (SEM) with a 95% confidence
interval between 1.22 and 5.68 (P< 0.001). Moreover, to further check this effect, we also
tested whether any brain activity represented the scrambled individual parameter (Δσ), in
which we randomly assigned each participant’s Δσ to another participant. We found no signifi-
cant neural correlates of the scrambled Δσ even at a liberal statistical threshold (P< 0.005,
uncorrected).
Third, given that results indicate that only the right lateral FPC satisfies both criteria, we
further tested whether functional connectivity between the dACC and right lateral FPC was
modulated by the size of the group while making decisions of judgment adaptation.
To do this, we performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses. In the PPI analy-
sis, we took as a seed the right lateral FPC and tested whether its functional connectivity to the
dACC was modulated during judgment adaptation. The ROI was defined as a 10-mm diame-
ter spherical ROI at the peak voxel in the right lateral FPC, (x,y,z) = (42,44,19), which was iden-
tified as being modulated by group size (large group trials > small group trials; GLM2). We
computed PPI maps to identify the brain areas for which functional connectivity with the right
FPC increased in trials in which participants were confronted with judgments of the large
group compared with trials in which they were confronted with judgments of the small group.
We found that changes in group size modulated connectivity between dACC and right lat-
eral FPC (PSVC < 0.05, FWE corrected within the small volume cluster in the dACC ROI, peak
[x,y,z] = [9,11,43]; Fig 6A). We also confirmed that the dACC region for which functional con-
nectivity to the lateral FPC was modulated by group size is located in the same dACC cluster
as that observed for conformity decisions (Conformity > No-conformity; black contour in
Fig 6A).
We further found that individual variability in the strength of functional connectivity
between large group (n = 20) trials and small group (n = 5) trials correlated with Δσ, the ten-
dency of individuals to assign greater credibility to the group’s opinion when the group size
Fig 6. Functional connectivity between lateral frontopolar cortex (FPC) and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC). (A) Psychophysiological interactions (PPI) analyses. The PPI used the right lateral FPC as a
seed (sphere of diameter = 10 mm centered at [x,y,z] = [42,44,19]). The functional connectivity between right
FPC and dACC increased when group size increased (P < 0.05, family-wise error [FWE] corrected within small
volume correction [SVC]). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean (SEM) (**, P < 0.001). (B)
Between-subject regression analysis considering the individual difference in the relative credibility of social
information (Δσ) as a covariate for the modulation of connectivity between dACC-FPC when presented with
social information of the large versus the small group (P < 0.05, FWE corrected within SVC). The scatter plot
was not used for statistical inference (which is carried out in the SPM framework). It is shown solely for
illustrative purposes. The functional MRI (fMRI) data can be found in http://neurovault.org/collections/2503/.
The data underlying this figure can be found in S1 Data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958.g006
Integration of individual and social information for group decisions
PLOS Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2001958 June 28, 2017 11 / 28
was large (Fig 6B). These results showed that connectivity between the FPC and the dACC
increased in those individuals with higher sensitivity to group size. Thus, both FPC activity
and the strength of FPC-dACC coupling influenced the degree to which social information
was integrated into the posterior belief of individual participants.
Discussion
Our findings show that a Bayesian model provides a good account of observed behavior when
a judgment based on a private estimate (individual information) is confronted by the aggre-
gated opinion of fellow members of a group (social information). According to our Bayesian
model, participants used both the confidence in one’s own judgments and group size of social
information to estimate the credibility of each type of information. Participants thus weighed
their initial judgment and the judgment of others by their respective level of credibility, inte-
grated them into a new belief, and changed their punitive judgments accordingly. Our Bayes-
ian model explains judgment-adaptation behavior better than other models. The Bayesian
model differs from alternative models in an important way. It predicts that judgment adapta-
tion should be sensitive to the credibility of both individual and social information, whereas
other models predict exclusive sensitivity to the level of social conflict.
When individuals made a decision to change their initial judgments to fit in with that of the
group, we observed that participants did not simply conform more to a larger group than to a
smaller group, nor did they have a higher level of social conflicts with the judgments of a larger
than a smaller group. Instead, participants tended to attribute more credibility to a larger than
a smaller group. Only the Bayesian model captures this effect. These results explain a long-
standing debate about the relationship between group size and social conformity [6]. While
some studies have observed that increasing group size does not influence conformity to the
group beyond a minimal number [4,5], others have reported that the larger the size of the
group, the larger the effect [46]. These studies suggest that the relationship between conformity
and group size cannot be described by a simple function but instead varies systematically with
factors that impact social-influence processes.
At a mechanistic level, our Bayesian model describes the neurocomputational mechanisms
underlying judgment adaptation in a group. A number of frontal cortex regions have previ-
ously been shown to be engaged during social decision-making, such as the dACC and the
FPC. Here, we show that specific signals integrating individual and social information are
computed in these 2 regions and shared between them. In particular, we investigated the neu-
ral implementations of 2 fundamental computations of Bayesian inference during collective
decisions: belief updates and credibility estimates of social information. The dACC computed
the belief updates that were necessary to adapt judgments, while the FPC computations
reflected the credibility that people assigned to social information. Furthermore, an increase in
functional connectivity between these 2 regions predicted individual differences in credibility
assigned to the judgments of a larger group, compared to the one assigned to the judgments of
a smaller group. The estimate of credibility of social information, computed in the FPC, was
critical for efficient Bayesian computation of belief updates, processed in the dACC. By moni-
toring the changes in the credibility of social information, the FPC may test the validity of indi-
vidual information and modulate the integration of social information.
Our results suggest a general functional role for the dACC, which is to update one’s belief
by integrating different types of information according to their respective credibility. Several
accounts have proposed that the dACC is engaged during conflict monitoring [45,47], and this
general function has been recently extended to the social domain, possibly reflecting computa-
tion of the difference between one’s own judgment and those of others (“social conflict”
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hypothesis) [26,48,49]. However, if conformity is only understood as a resolution of social con-
flicts, the changes in judgments should exclusively depend on perceived differences in judg-
ment (D = JS−J1) but not on the changes in credibility of each source of information. Thus, the
effects of changes in confidence (C), group size (G), and their interaction effects with the per-
ceived differences in judgments (D × C and D × G) should be independent from the changes in
judgments. Here, by incorporating the changes in credibility of each source information, how-
ever, we provide evidence that the Bayesian model captures the variances of judgment adapta-
tion across trials. Specifically, in some instances, individuals maintain their initial judgments,
while in other instances, the same individuals change their judgments to conform to the
group, even though they are faced with the same level of social conflict. We found that partici-
pants with high confidence in their judgments tended to assign greater credibility to individual
information. Moreover, the Bayesian model shows that the dACC encodes the updates of the
beliefs about the validity of one’s judgment (DKL) after integrating the judgments of others.
This Bayesian model allows us to explain intra-individual variability in judgment adaptation
and to account for dACC activity better than other psychological conformity models. A previ-
ous study using a saccadic planning task demonstrated that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC) was activated when updating internal models about the probabilistic state of uncertain
environments while integrating perceptual information [33]. In the current study, we found
that belief updates about the best judgment to make also rely upon dACC computations. That
is, the activity of the dACC reflected updates of one’s beliefs after integrating individual infor-
mation with social information, rather than alternative computations from the other 3 models.
By providing evidence that the dACC contributes to belief updates in the context of our group
decision-making task, our findings generalize this computational role of dACC to the domain
of social decision-making. However, we do not claim that this region is engaged in processing
social information per se. In fact, other regions of the ACC appear to have much more special-
ized roles in social cognition [50–52]. In particular, the anterior ACC gyrus may be more
engaged in tracking the intention of others or in computing the costs and benefits of acting in
social contexts, whereas the ACC sulcus may be more involved in monitoring the value of
one’s own action [53,54].
It could be argued that dACC activation reflects increases in decision difficulty rather than
model updating [41,43]. According to this interpretation, dACC signals the need for control
when overriding a default belief. In the Bayesian model, the optimal decision of when to
update one’s belief depends on when the value of a conformity decision is equal to the value of
keeping the previous decision. In many decision-making situations, decision difficulty and
belief updates are confounded. Critically, in our study, decision difficulty can be distinguished
from belief updates when participants had low levels of confidence in their individual informa-
tion and were confronted with large differences in social information. In such cases, partici-
pants needed to update their belief by a large amount, but at the same time, the decision was
easy. If dACC activity represented decision difficulty rather than belief updates, the Bayesian
model would not be able to explain the neural correlates of judgment changes better than
other models. Indeed, we found that the dACC activity predicting conformity decisions is
explained by Bayesian belief updates measures (referred to as DKL), even in a GLM allowing
belief updates to compete with measures of difficulty (level of surprise and reaction times) to
explain variance in dACC activity [33,44,45]. In addition, if greater surprise caused the larger
demands for control (corresponding to decision difficulty), then dACC activity would have
been better explained by the surprise model, which was not the case.
In addition, our findings demonstrate that the FPC computes the credibility that people
assign to social information. That is, those individuals who assign a greater credibility to social
information with larger group sizes show higher activity in FPC when integrating the social
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information of a larger group compared to that of a smaller group. Moreover, our neuroimag-
ing results indicate that FPC activity, and also FPC-dACC connectivity, play an important role
in regulating the degree to which group size influenced credibility estimates of social informa-
tion. Indeed, both FPC activity and the strength of connectivity between the dACC and FPC
predicted inter-individual variances in the credibility assignment to the judgments of a group
as a function of changes in group size. For adaptive decision-making in ever-changing envi-
ronments, the human FPC has been reported to serve probabilistic inferences about the credi-
bility of available information to make optimal use for decision-making [55–57]. Moreover,
the lateral FPC is involved in monitoring alternative behavioral strategies and in deciding to
switch to alternative courses of actions when one alternative strategy becomes more credible
in comparison with the ongoing one [25,58,60]. Activity in this region also reflects individual
differences in the extent to which learning is driven by the prediction errors of one’s belief
about the best judgments when new evidence is given [59]. Consistent with this role, our
results provide evidence that the FPC processes the credibility of alternative opinions. Thus, a
key role of the FPC in social decision-making may be to monitor the credibility of social infor-
mation when individual information is uncertain. This is an essential capacity to promote flex-
ible behavior in environments in which the current decision strategies become unreliable.
It is worth noting that the FPC may have evolved to manage our unusually complex social
systems [60,61]. In nonhuman primates, gray matter density of the FPC has been reported to
increase with social network size [62]. The FPC, which develops late both from a phylogenetic
and ontogenetic perspective in humans, may serve demands requiring interactions with larger
social groups. Such cognitive demands of sociality could place a constraint on the number of
individuals with whom we can interact and maintain contact with [60,62].
The current findings differ from previous studies on social influence and conformity
[49,63] by allowing us to dissociate the credibility of social information from changes in confi-
dence/uncertainty in one’s belief. These previous studies reported ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC) activation of choice options that vary with the choices of others [49], as well as
with the level of confidence in the choices of others [63]. Such vmPFC activity may signal
increases in the confidence of individuals’ decisions once social information has been inte-
grated with individual information, reflecting the possibility that participants gain reassurance
in their choice from the choices of others who are confident in their decision. This interpreta-
tion is supported by the recent findings showing that vmPFC activity encodes decision confi-
dence by reflecting the amount of accumulated evidence favoring one option over the others
[38,64]. Future work will need to measure the level of confidence not only after making the
initial judgment but also after the judgment adaptation to clarify how vmPFC, dACC, and lat-
eral FPC interact to flexibly exchange information at these different stages of social decision-
making.
While most previous research has focused on ACC or FPC functions in isolation [45,65],
dACC-FPC interactions have been relatively unexplored. Our results show that a higher degree
of credibility to a larger group was reflected by an increase in the connectivity between the
dACC and FPC. This change in the strength of the functional connectivity between the dACC
and FPC may reflect a readout function of the dACC from the FPC to compute the Bayesian
inference, since credibility estimates of social information are required to update one’s belief
in an optimal fashion. Thus, our findings suggest the dACC-FPC network plays a key role in
the context of group decision-making and judgment’s adaptation in the context of social deci-
sion-making.
To develop neurocomputational models of social decision-making, we specified which vari-
ables are computed for judgment adaptation within a group and how they are implemented in
specific brain regions. A key novel aspect of the current study is to determine the behavioral
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algorithm for belief updates of individuals about the most preferable judgment and examine
the neural correlates of this process. This is distinct from past studies asking participants to
rate their preferences for goods or attractiveness of faces [26–28], in which the credibility of
different sources of information was not relevant to make a decision of social conformity. The
crucial novel contributions of the present study are also as follows: (i) to determine how the
credibility of individual and social information are computed for updating one’s judgment,
taking into consideration one’s confidence and group size, which was ignored in previous pref-
erence-based rating paradigms [26,27,66]; and (ii) to test a Bayesian model against plausible
alternative models, which were matched with regards to access to information about the choice
options.
Together, our findings transform the current thinking about the neural basis of conformity
and collective decision-making by proposing a neurocomputational understanding about how
individuals adapt their judgments by integrating social influences of other individuals in a
group. Our study specifies how the human brain benefits from the wisdom of a larger group
while preserving confidence in one’s initial judgment [10]. It also delineates the neurocompu-
tational mechanisms at the source of inter-individual differences in assigning credibility to the
opinion of groups with different sizes. By identifing the brain region tracking the credibility
of social information, our findings also provide a mechanistic account of the computational
mechanisms underlying judgment adaptation during collective decision-making.
Materials and methods
Ethics statement
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the local ethics committee
(Lyon, France, IRB n˚A13-37030), and all participants gave their informed written consent.
Participants
Participants were 25 healthy French volunteers (age range 20–26 years, 13 males). Data from 2
participants were discarded because of excessive movements during scanning. Therefore, data
from 23 subjects (11 males; mean age 21.22 ± 0.463 years; error indicates SEM) were included
in the final analysis.
Task design
During this experiment, participants were asked to make a series of punitive judgments on
murder cases as part of a jury while undergoing conditional blocks of fMRI. At the beginning
of each block, we displayed the size of the jury for 3 s (either 5- or 20-person juries) to inform
participants of how many individuals were also making a judgment in the current murder case
along with them. In each trial (60 trials in total), subjects first read the scenario of a murder
case for 15 s. They then made 3 successive decisions for each murder case.
First, participants were asked to make a judgment about how many years of prison the
defendant deserved (J1). They reported it by moving a continuous numerical sliding cursor
from the initial sentence of 15 years to the final value of prison years ranging from 0 to 30 for 8
s. We also informed participants that 15 years is the average prison sentence for murder case
trials in France. The trials for which the participants failed to respond within 8 s were excluded
from the further analyses. The position of the cursor was marked on the screen with the corre-
sponding number of years in prison to make sure that the participants were aware of their
judgment.
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Second, participants had 6 s to rate the level of subjective confidence (C) that they had
while making their J1, using a Likert scale of 10 items from −5 (low confidence) to +5 (high
confidence) by moving a similar cursor on the screen.
Third, participants were given a chance to reconsider their first judgment (J1) with the
knowledge of the average sentence given by the other members of the jury (JS). Social informa-
tion was revealed by a green bar on the slider with its corresponding numerical value in prison
years (bottom of the screen). During 8 s, the participants could review J1 by moving the cursor
from the value they had chosen during their first assessment to one corresponding to their
desirable reconsidered judgment (J2).
To encourage fully sincere judgments of participants who may moderate their J1 by
considering the future chance of reviewing their judgment (J2) with the knowledge of JS, we
instructed them that the chance to review would be given only in some trials. The participants
did not have a chance to revise for 8 randomly arranged trials among 60 trials. We analyzed 52
valid trials per participant. Critically, we instructed the participants that they did not need
to change their J1, but that they could if they felt that the changes would be more preferable
judgments.
A fixation cross was shown for the inter-stimuli intervals (ISI) after the scenario presenta-
tion, and between judgments (J1, C, and J2), and for the inter-trial interval (ITI). Both ISI and
ITI durations were randomized from 4 s to 7 s. We presented scenarios in pseudo-random
order across participants. Specifically, the order of presentation of conditions of the different
size jury group and its combination with sets of scenarios were counterbalanced across subjects.
Judgment of other jurors and social contextualization
We instructed the participants that the given social information, JS, is the average judgments
of some of the previous participants. Specifically, we informed them that the computer ran-
domly selected the judgments of 4 or 19 previous participants according to the condition.
Moreover, participants were told that only those individuals who had assigned a higher
level of confidence to their initial judgments (J1) than the average level of confidence of all par-
ticipants were selected. Likewise, participants were informed that their judgments would be
presented to the next participants when they reported a high level of confidence. Using this
design, participants were explicitly informed that the other jury members would be different
in each trial.
JS was a computer-generated value. We manipulated the judgments of others to make sure
that all participants reconsidered their judgments under influences of all ranges of differences
in judgments (|D|). Notably, by design, the group never had the same level of punishment
judgments as individual participants (J1 6¼ JS). Simultaneously, we ensured that the judgments
of the group were not too different from those of participants’ in order to make participants
believe that those were made by other previous participants. To do this, JS was established for
each trial by the computer so that the difference (D = JS − J1) between JS and J1 was within the
range of 4 years to 10 years (4 |D| 10).
Moreover, to control for the possibility that participants might be able to learn the consis-
tency of the group judgments (social information) over the trials, the direction of differences
in judgments (whether social information was severer or milder than one’s initial judgments,
J1) was pseudo-randomly determined across trials. That is, we ensured that every participant
was given judgments of others that were more severe than theirs during one half of trials and
that judgments of others were more lenient than theirs during the other half.
On average, the participants perceived 6.98 ± 0.18 (SEM) years difference from their initial
judgments when confronted with the judgments of others. This was also true within participants
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while they were making judgments within different jury group sizes (G) (jDj ¼ 7:10  0:25
(when n = 20; jDj ¼ 6:85  0:27 when n = 5).
The scenarios
A crime scenario was composed of the facts (plain explanation of who did what) and the cir-
cumstances (contexts and reasons why the defendant committed the murder). One hundred
murder-case scenarios were initially produced for this study, which included 32 cases collected
from a previous study [67] and 68 additional scenarios inspired by real stories taken from the
news with the same structure.
The length ranged from 50 to 60 words (mean length = 54.95 ± 0.36 [SEM]). All scenarios
were written in 3 sentences. To minimize the bias, we informed participants before the experi-
ment that we changed the name of the defendants to either “Jean” or “Marie.”
Half of the scenarios included the circumstances that were expected to induce sympa-
thetic emotion for the defendant (sympathetic cases), and the other half did not (nonsympa-
thetic cases). Sixty among 100 scenarios were selected based on the responses of elicited
sympathetic emotions that were acquired from the 20 different healthy subjects (10 males,
mean age = 21.43 ± 0.46 [SEM] years) using the same scale of sympathetic emotion ratings.
The average rating for selected scenarios was −0.48 ± 0.21 (SEM). They were significantly
split into 2 groups according to their rating (t = −39.31, P< 0.001, 2-sample t test). The dura-
tion of scenario presentation in the main experiments (15 s) was also decided based on the
sample group’s speed of reading.
Behavioral data analysis
The impact of social information, modulating individual judgments, was measured at the level
of conformity (LC).
LC ¼
J2   J1
JS   J1
ð1Þ
We also compared them under the impacts of different levels of subjective confidence (C,
individual median split) and different group sizes (G). All the comparisons were performed by
LMEM.
Bayesian decision-making model
The Bayesian decision-making model assumed that participants were trying to estimate the
most preferable punishment judgment (J) for each scenario. There were 2 cues that partici-
pants could rely on: (1) their initial reading of the scenario, which led to a private estimation of
individuals (jIndividual) of J, and (2) the estimation made by the social group (jSocial) of J. Partici-
pants combined these 2 cues to produce a final estimate of J where the value of J maximized
the probability distribution, p(J|jIndividual, jSocial). Applying Bayes rule, we evaluated the proba-
bility distribution as
pðJjjIndividual; jSocialÞ ¼ pðjIndividual; jSocialjJÞ  pðJÞ=pðjIndividual; jSocialÞ
Note that in the above equation, p(J) was the prior belief about J (i.e., the belief about J even
before receiving any information). In the current study, this prior belief was considered to
have uniform distribution (no biases). By considering the social and the individual estimates
to be independent in this study, we could estimate the p(jIndividual|J) as below.
pðJjjIndividual; jSocialÞ ¼ pðjIndividualjJÞ  pðjSocialjJÞ  pðJÞ=pðjindividual; jSocialÞ
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The p(jIndividual|J) was assumed to be Gaussian, ~ Norm(J1, τ2), with mean, J1, and variance,
τ2. The credibility of the individual estimate was thus 1/τ2, which was dependent on the level
of confidence reports.
pðjIndividualjJÞ  NormðJ1; t
2Þ where t2 ¼ ðbC þ oCCÞ
  1
ð2Þ
Similarly, we considered p(jSocial|J) to be Gaussian, ~ Norm(JS, σ2), with mean, JS, and vari-
ance, σ2.
pðjSocialjJÞ  NormðJS; σ
2Þ ð3Þ
The credibility of the social information p(jSocial|J) was thus 1/σ2, which was dependent on
the group size. Specifically, when a participant was confronted with the judgments of groups
of different sizes, she might assign a different level of credibility to social information (e.g.,
the credibility 1=s2
20
was assigned to jSocial when the group was large; the credibility 1=s25 was
assigned to jSocial when the group was small).
Inter-individual differences in estimated credibility of social information were measured by
their ratio, called “relative credibility” (Δσ). This parameter Δσ indicated, therefore, the indi-
vidual variability of the sensitivity to the changes in group size when participants assigned
credibility to social information when confronted with the judgments of others (JS).
Δσ ¼ log
1=σ2
20
1=σ2
5
 
¼logσ2
5
  logσ2
20
ð4Þ
When the prior belief, p(J), was given as a uniform distribution, the final distribution,
p(J|jIndividual, jSocial), also followed a normal distribution with its mean being the weighted aver-
age of these 2 cues. Each cue was weighted by its credibility, and the credibility of the com-
bined belief was the sum of these 2 levels of credibility.
pðJjjIndividual; jSocialÞ  Norm
τ2JS þ σ2J1
σ2 þ τ2
;
σ2τ2
σ2 þ τ2
 
ð5Þ
Eventually, participants who made the initial judgments, J1, based on their individual esti-
mates of J (p(jIndividual|J)) changed to J2 based on their final estimates of J (p(J|jIndividual, jSocial)).
According to that, the Bayesian model predicted the judgments, bJ2 . Specifically, changes in
judgments, bJ2   J1, were predicted by the Kullback–Leibler divergence (DKL) between 2 proba-
bility distributions—the individual estimate of J, p(jPrivate|J), and the final estimate of J, p(J|jIndi-
vidual, jSocial). The value of DKL was computed as [40,68]
bJ2   J1¼DKLðpðjIndividualjJÞjjpðJjjIndividual; jSocialÞÞ¼
X30
i¼0
pðijjIndividualÞlog
pðijjIndividualÞ
pðijjIndividual; jSocialÞ
ð6Þ
where p(i|jIndividual) was the probability that the punishment magnitude of i years would be
made when the juror had an individual estimate of J, p(jIndividual|J) as the preferable punish-
ment for the defendant in the scenario, and p(i|jIndividual, jSocial) was the same quantity, given
the final estimate of J, p(J|jIndividual, jSocial) after integrating social information p(jSocial|J).
Alternative models of judgment adaptation
We also predicted changes in judgments (bJ2) under social influences with 2 alternative models.
Together with the prediction of the “Bayesian model” (Eq 6), these predictions (bJ2   J1) of alter-
native decision-making models—the “linear model” (Eq 7) and “surprise model” (Eq 8)—were
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compared with actual behavioral changes (J2 − J1).
bJ2   J1¼βL þ ðωD þ ωGGþ ωSSÞDþ ωCC þ ωDCDCþ ωJ jJ1j ð7Þ
The “linear model” (Eq 7) predicts the changes in judgments (bJ2   J1) by a linear regression
model that takes into account the given deviation in the group judgments (D = JS − J1), the level
of confidence that one had for their judgments (C = [−1:+1]), the group size (G = [0, small
group trials; 1, large group trials]), and 2-way interaction effects (D × C, and D ×G). We also
assumed an interaction effect between the deviation in judgments and the types of scenarios
(D × S where S = [−1, sympathetic cases; 1, nonsympathetic cases]). That is, participants were
expected to change their judgments more when the group made milder level of punishment
than themselves (JS< J1) in sympathetic scenarios and when groups made severer punishment
than themselves (JS> J1) in nonsympathetic scenarios. We also tested the effect of initial judg-
ments (J1) to test its potential effect on regression-to-the-mean: the behavioral tendency that
participants were more (or less) likely to conform to JS when J1 was close to extreme (0 years or
30 years). To test this effect, we included the absolute value of the normalized J1 (−1 to 1 range;
|J1 |) in the regression analysis. Therefore, |J1 | indicated the scale of judgments that participants
moved from the default (15 years) while making the initial judgment. In this model, βL indicates
the constant. Taken together, the “linear model” tested whether individuals were motivated to
reduce the perceived deviation in the group judgments by adjusting their prior judgments. In
particular, this model also tested whether this behavioral tendency was stronger when they had
high confidence in their judgments, when they were confronted by judgments of the large
group, and when they were confronted by judgments of the group that were more extreme than
theirs.
bJ2   J1¼βSþωUUþðωGGþωSSÞDþωJ jJ1j ð8Þ
The “surprise model” (Eq 8) predicts the changes in judgments (bJ2   J1) by a linear regres-
sion model that also takes into account the interaction effects with group size and scenario
types (D × G, and D × S), and the initial judgments (|J1 |), which were defined the same as those
in the “linear model.” One difference of the “surprise model” is that it considers confidence as a
level of precision of one’s own belief about the right amount of punishment for the criminal.
Therefore, this model assumes that participants change their judgments based on the surprise
of how much the judgment of others differs from their own belief. According to information
theory [40], the surprise (U) evoked by such unpredicted observation is the entropy of the
unpredictability of an event, α, given the belief of the participant
U¼  log pðαjPriorÞÞ¼  log pðJsjNormðJ1; τ
2ÞÞ ð9Þ
where τ follows a function of one’s reported confidence as in Eq 2 in the “Bayesian model,”
which includes 2 free parameters (βC and ωC). This model predicts that changes in judgments
are proportional to how unlikely others made their judgment, JS, given the prior beliefs of par-
ticipants, J1, with the subjective confidence, C.
Behavioral model comparison
The model predictions of the changes in judgments (bJ2   J1) were fitted with subjects’ changes
in behavioral performance(J2 − J1). We estimated the parameters that maximized the predict-
ability of each of the 3 models. The goodness-of-fit of each model was measured with its log
likelihood. If the t × 1 vector of observation is denoted by X (t indicates the number of trials)
and its prediction is estimated as the vector bX (same length as X), the relationship between the
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sample and its prediction is defined as:
X ¼ ZbX þ ε
The vector of the error term, ε, has a multivariate normal distribution conditional on η. We
assumed that the mean of the error distribution was equal to 0 and that the covariance was
equal to ϵ2.
2 ¼ Var ½εijZ
The log likelihood of each model is equal to the logarithm of the product of the likelihoods
of each change in judgment. Therefore, the −2log likelihood function is computed as follows:
  2lnLðX; bXÞ ¼ t lnð2πϵ2Þ þ
1
ϵ2
Xt
i¼1
ðbXi  ηXiÞ
2
ð10Þ
To account for over-fitting, we trained each of the models using an in-sample optimization
procedure using an iterative LOOCV procedure, in which data from all but 1 trial (51 trials)
were used to perform an out-sample prediction against the left-out trial data of each subject.
This procedure was repeated 52 times by omitting a different trial each time. Therefore, data
from each of the 52 trials was used exactly once as validation data. The series of log likelihoods
were averaged across trials and across participants to produce a single estimation. By compar-
ing the prediction power of our models, we examined which model could best explain the
underlying mechanisms of the process of judgment adaptation. Model parameters were fitted
using the multivariate constrained minimization function in MATLAB 2015 (MathWorks,
MA, USA). To select the best model among the 3, we compared the log likelihood that intro-
duced a penalty according to the number of free parameters. The BIC is computed based on
the log likelihood where k is the number of estimated parameters in the model.
BIC¼  2lnLþklnðtÞ ð11Þ
We assumed that the model parameters were fixed throughout execution of the task,
because subjects had been instructed that each murder case was independent and also because
participants were told that the other members of the jury differed on each trial. The number
of free parameters of each model was as follows: (1) 7 for the “linear model”—ωD, ωG, ωS, ωC,
ωDC, ωJ, and βL; (2) 7 for the “surprise model”—ωU, ωG, ωS, ωJ, ωC, βC, and βS,; and (3) 4 for
the “Bayesian model”—βC, ωC, σn = 5, and σn = 20.
Neural model comparison
We also compared the neural correlates of the model predicting changes in judgment with the
corresponding brain responses encoding changes in judgments. We ran a separate GLM using
parametric regressors of changes in judgement and the model predictions of these changes
(GLM3). We extracted the parameter estimates representing the neural correlates of each
model prediction. We then compared them with brain responses that correlate with behavioral
changes in judgment. Parameter estimates were extracted from the dACC ROI. Consistent
with neural model comparisons from previous studies, we compared the likelihood of each
model [69,70]. When the variance of errors of each model prediction is ϵ2, and t is the number
of time series, the −2 log likelihood is computed as described by Eq 10. All models had 1
parameter, the coefficient of the single regressor.
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fMRI data acquisition
Functional images were acquired with a 1.5 T Siemens Magnetom Sonata Maestro Class MRI
System (Siemens, Munich, Germany) at the CERMEP in the Groupement Hospitalier Est,
Lyon, France. A higher order shimming procedure was completed covering the whole brain of
each participant. The imaging parameters for the EPI T2-weighted sequence were as follows:
repetition time (TR), 2500 ms; echo time (TE), 60 ms; flip angle, 90˚; FOV, 220 mm, acquisi-
tion matrix, 64 × 64, slice thickness = 4 mm. Contiguous slices were acquired in interleaved
order. To acquire whole-brain images, the magnetic field was tilted with minus 20˚ from the
anterior to posterior commissure line (AC-PC) of each participant. The imaging parameters
for the T1-weighted anatomical scan were as follows: TR, 1970 ms; TE, 3.93 ms; FOV, 256
mm; matrix 256 x 256; slice thickness, 1 mm.
The stimuli were presented with a screen resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels, displayed at a
visual angle of 24 × 18˚, centered on a 500 × 500 pixel array, and surrounded by a black back-
ground. The participants were asked to use their index and middle fingers of both hands to
answer by pressing a 4-button controller. Stimuli were presented, and the responses to the sti-
muli were collected using the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, CA, USA).
fMRI data analysis
Image preprocessing was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,
UCL, UK). Time-series images were registered in a 3-dimensional space to minimize any effect
that could result from the motion of the participants’ heads. Functional scans were realigned
to the last volume, corrected for slice timing, and unwarped to correct for geometric distor-
tions. Inhomogeneities, distortions related to correction maps, were created using the phase of
nonEPI gradient echo images measured at 2 echo times (5.19 ms for the first echo and 9.95 ms
for the second). These were coregistered with structural maps, spatially normalized into the
standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas space, and then spatially smoothed with
an 8 mm isotropic full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel using standard pro-
cedures in SPM8.
We constructed 3 separate GLMs. For the first GLM (GLM1), we ran a first-level analysis,
modeling brain responses related to revising judgments while confronted with the judgments
of others. The conformity trials (LC > 0) and nonconformity trials (LC 0) were modeled
separately. They were modeled as a boxcar function time-locked to the onset of social informa-
tion (JS) with the duration of a response time in each trial to make a judgment (J2). Brain
responses related to making punishment judgments after reading a crime scenario (J1) were
modeled separately. These were modeled as a boxcar function time-locked to the onset of deci-
sion-making with duration of reaction times in each trial. In addition, the 6 motion parameters
produced for head movement and the 2 motor parameters produced for buttons pressing with
the right and the left hands were also entered as additional regressors of no interest to account
for motion-related artifacts. All these regressors were convolved with the canonical hemody-
namic response function. Contrast images were calculated and entered into a second-level
group analysis. In the GLM1, brain regions recruited by conformity decisions were first identi-
fied using the contrasts “conformity trials > nonconformity trials.”
We also tested another version of GLM1 with a fixed boxcar duration of 4 s starting at the
onset of social information (JS) with all other settings kept identical to GLM1. By fixing the
boxcar duration, we tested whether the estimated brain activity in GLM1 was still robust when
disregarding inter-trial differences in responses times that could reflect different levels of diffi-
culty in decision-making. To do this, we compared the effects sizes of GLM1 to those of an
alternative model. If the effect size estimated from the GLM1 does not decrease in this
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alternative model, this supports the idea that brain activity observed in GLM1 is involved in
judgment adaptation rather than processing the level of difficulty.
The second GLM (GLM2) was the same as GLM1 except that the blood-oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) response related to revising judgments was separately modeled by group
size, instead of conformity decisions. In detail, BOLD responses related to revising judgments
when confronted by the judgments of a larger group (20 juries) were separately modeled from
those related to revising judgments when confronted with the judgments of a smaller group (5
juries). They were further modulated by parametric regressors accounting for a perceived dif-
ference in judgments (D = JS − J1). Contrast images were calculated based on the parameter
estimates output by the GLM and were then entered into a second-level group analysis. First,
we found the group-size–related brain activity (large group trials> small group trials). Second,
we found the brain area where the group-size–related activity further correlated with individ-
ual differences of Δσ, which was defined as the ratio between the estimated credibility of social
information in the large group and the credibility of social information in the small group. To
this end, we performed a regression analysis in the second-level analysis by entering Δσ as a
covariate across participants.
The third GLM (GLM3) was designed to identify the brain regions in which activity para-
metrically encoded the model-based predictions of changes in judgments that were estimated
by the 3 different computational models (bJ2   J1) and the actual behavioral of changes in judg-
ments (J2 − J1). For this GLM, each event was treated as a regressor to extract the time series of
beta parameters. This approach has previously been used for multivariate and functional con-
nectivity analyses [71]. In GLM3, the BOLD responses related to revising judgments were
modeled as a boxcar function including reaction times and modulated by parametric regres-
sors accounting for the 3 different model predictions. Again, because differences in reaction
times may reflect inter-trial differences in the level of difficulty in decision-making, we also
tested an alternative model of GLM3 by fixing the boxcar duration to 4 s starting at the onset
of social information (JS). All the other settings were kept identical with the GLM3.
We compared the parameter estimates related with the model-based predictions of changes
in judgments to find which of them closely represents the parameter related to actual changes
in judgments. BOLD responses to the initial judgments (J1) and 8 types of motion regressors
were also included in the GLMs and convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response
function (HRF). Modulation of brain activity by the changes in judgments and the model-
based predictions of changes in judgments were calculated and entered into a second-level
analysis. We further examined how accurately the behavioral models explained BOLD
responses related to changes in judgments. For this analysis, we extracted the time courses of
dACC activity from the first-level contrasts of each participant modulated by model prediction
of changes in judgments. They were then compared with the time course of dACC activity
modulated by the actual changes in judgments. All time courses were extracted from the
dACC ROI that we defined as a 10-mm diameter sphere, centered on the dACC ROI at x,y,
z = 8,18,46, based on a previous meta-analysis study [28]. The accuracy level of BOLD activity
was estimated by the −2 log likelihood of all participants (Eq 10) and the BIC, considering the
number of free parameters of each model were used for the model comparison.
To investigate whether dACC activity reflects Bayesian updates rather than choice diffi-
culty, we performed an additional GLM (GLM4). With this model, we addressed the alterna-
tive interpretation that the variance in decision-related dACC activity reflects how difficult the
decision was and how long it took. As in GLM3, the BOLD responses related to revising judg-
ments were modeled with a 4-s boxcar duration, starting at the onset of social information (JS).
We included the following parametric regressors: the Bayesian updates measures (DKL in
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Eq 6), the level of unexpected surprise (U in Eq 9), as a measure of difficulty, and the reaction
times. In doing so, we examined whether the Bayesian update regressors could still explain
dACC activity when allowed to compete with other regressors that possibly explain variance in
the dACC signals. In the model specification process, the serial orthogonalization of paramet-
ric modulators was turned off. A SVC was performed within the dACC cluster activated for
the conformity decision (PFWE < 0.05; on the basis of an initial uncorrected threshold at
P< 0.001).
We report results corrected for FWE with multiple comparisons (PFWE < 0.05). This
approach assesses the strength of activations defined by an initial uncorrected threshold,
which we take as P< 0.001 for all analyses [72].
ROI analysis
Three ROIs were defined independently to test and to support our findings. They include
dACC and right and left lateral FPC. For each analysis, a single, predefined ROI was used. For
the ROI analyses, a SVC was performed (PFWE < 0.05; on the basis of an initial uncorrected
threshold at P< 0.001 [72]).
We used an a priori anatomically defined region of the dACC, which was defined by a
10-mm diameter spherical ROI centered at x,y,z = 8,18,46 (MNI coordinates). This dACC ROI
was adopted based on the results of an ALE meta-analysis concerning the neural substrates of
conformity behavior [28]. To correct the results of the conformity-decision–related activation
for multiple comparisons (GLM1), we used a SVC. The same ROI was also used to extract beta
parameter estimates to compare computational models to the dACC activity representing
the changes in judgments (GLM3). Parameter estimates were extracted from all voxels in the
ROI and averaged using MarsBaR 0.43 (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net). Finally, this ROI was
used to test whether its functional connectivity to the right lateral FPC was modulated by the
changes in group sizes.
We defined 2 ROIs in the bilateral FPC to extract parameter estimates. The beta parameters
were extracted from 2 FPC ROIs, defined as 10-mm diameter spheres centered at each peak
voxel of the clusters in the bilateral FPC (x,y,z) = (27,57,10) and (−30,58,15) in MNI coordinates.
To further check that the recorded pattern of FPC activity reflected individual differences,
we used 2 additional analyses [73,74]. First, the changes in the parameter estimate (large group
trials—small group trials) served to perform a bootstrapping sampling analysis (10,000 times
of iteration). Notably, parameter estimates and bootstrapping were performed separately from
the ROIs in the right and the left FPC. This procedure allowed us to infer the effect size of the
relationship between the changes in FPC activation and sensitivity to group size when assign-
ing credibility to social information (Δσ) across individuals in a larger dataset. The relationship
between the vector of the predicted parameter and the same length vector of the extracted
parameter estimates were tested with a linear regression, which enabled us to estimate mean
predictability and standard deviation. Based on an assumption that the predictability distribu-
tion is normal, we further estimated the 95% confidence interval. Second, we performed a
scrambling analysis [75,76]. That is, we scrambled Δσ across participants and assigned each
participant’s Δσ to another participant. In doing so, we tested whether any brain activity repre-
sents this randomly assigned Δσ.
Psychophysiological interaction analysis
To assess changes in functional connectivity during the presence of social information as a
function of changes in group size (large, 20-person jury versus small, 5-person jury condi-
tions), we performed a PPI analysis. The PPI allowed us to identify the brain areas where
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activity can be explained by the interaction between activity in a seed region and the subse-
quent process involved in the decisions to conform to social information. For the PPI, we
defined the seed region in right FPC on the peak voxel, (x,y,z) = (41,44,19). We used the
Generalized PPI toolbox from SPM (gPPI) [77], which allowed us to create a new GLM in
which the deconvolved activity of the seed region is assigned to the context-dependent
regressors and reconvolved with HRF. Average time courses were extracted from all voxels
in a predefined ROI surrounding the peak voxel in the right FPC clusters. The time courses
were extracted from the activities modulated by group size (GLM2 at the contrast of “large-
group trials > small-group trials”). The main effects of trials in different group sizes, the
seed-region time course, and motion parameters were included as regressors of no interest.
The PPI contrast compares large-group trials × right FPC (+1) with small-group
trials × right FPC (−1).
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activity when changing judgments to con-
form to those of the group. The peak is located at (x,y,z) = (0,12,39). The HRF was convolved
with a boxcar of 4 s after the onset of social information (alternative GLM1; PFWE<0.05 in
SVC).
(PNG)
S2 Fig. Activation map showing the parametric effects of the changes in judgments pre-
dicted by the Bayesian model (the KL divergence). The dACC region was found to compute
the level of judgment updates that was predicted by the Bayesian model, even in a situation
where the level of surprise and reaction times were included as additional regressors. The peak
is located at (x,y,z) = (6,8,49; GLM4; PFWE<0.05 in SVC).
(PNG)
S1 Data. Data for Figs 1C, 1D, 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 4B, 5B and 6.
(XLSX)
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